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2520537 – Social Choice Theory (lect. + exerc.)

On many occasions, groups (committees, panels, entire societies etc.) need to aggregate individual preferences (or, more generally, judgments) to make collective choices. Social Choice Theory is concerned with studying aggregation precedures from a formal point of view. This course provides a careful and comprehensive treatment of preference and judgment aggregation, including proofs of general results that have Arrow's famous impossibility theorem and Gibbard's oligarchy theorem as corollaries. The second part of the course is devoted to voting theory. Among other things, we prove the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.
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Description

On many occasions, groups (committees, panels, entire societies etc.) need to aggregate individual preferences (or, more generally, judgments) to make collective choices. Social Choice Theory is concerned with studying aggregation precedures from a formal point of view. This course provides a careful and comprehensive treatment of preference and judgment aggregation, including proofs of general results that have Arrow's famous impossibility theorem and Gibbard's oligarchy theorem as corollaries. The second part of the course is devoted to voting theory. Among other things, we prove the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.

General

Language
German

Availability

Access
08. Apr 2021, 12:55 - 31. Mar 2022, 12:55
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Unlimited

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Object-Id
2001628
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Created on
07. Apr 2021, 09:32